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We study optimal monetary policy design in a simple model that deviates from the
linear-quadratic paradigm and provides a rationale for the practice of inﬂation zone
targeting. We show that the presence of either zone-quadratic preferences or a zone-
linear relationship between inﬂation and economic activity provides strong incentives
to deviate from conventional linear policies. We calibrate the model based on param-
eters for the U.S. and the Euro area and employ a numerical dynamic programming
algorithm to derive the optimal policies. With this algorithm, we examine the role
of uncertainty, model structure and relative preference towards economic stability in
determining the width of the implied targeted inﬂation zone.
Keywords: Inﬂation targeting, price stability, optimal monetary policy.
JEL Classication System: E31, E52, E58, E611 Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of central banks around the world have announced
inﬂation targets and have adopted an explicit inﬂation targeting framework for mon-
etary policy. Well-known examples of countries with inﬂation targeting central banks
are Canada, New Zealand, Sweden and the U.K.. An expanding literature has dis-
cussed the practical experience with inﬂation targeting and provided formal evalua-
tions (see, for example, Haldane (1995), Leiderman and Svensson (1995), Svensson
(1997, 1999a,b,c,d), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin
and Posen (1999)). Based on this experience and analysis, some authors have also ad-
vocated the adoption of such an inﬂation-targeting framework by the Federal Reserve
for the U.S. and by the European Central Bank for the Euro area.
For the most part, formal, quantitative evaluations of monetary policy in pursuit of
an inﬂation target have been based on linear models of the economy with a quadratic
objective function for the policymaker. Although appropriate in some cases, this ap-
proach does not fully capture the actual practice of inﬂation-targeting central banks.
Most of these central banks tend to emphasize containing inﬂation within a target
range rather than aiming for a point target. Fundamentally, a monetary policy that
focuses on containing inﬂation within a zone implies a dierent response to shocks
depending on whether inﬂation is within the zone or outside of it. This dierence
in policy responsiveness at the margin is inconsistent with the conventional linear-
quadratic framework which implies that the optimal policy rule is linear. By contrast,
a target range invariably suggests a nonlinearity in the policy response function. Such
target ranges are often motivated by the existence of uncertainty in the process of
inﬂation. But optimal policies in the conventional linear-quadratic framework are
invariant to such uncertainty. Thus, it may be necessary to entertain alternatives to
the linear-quadratic framework in order to improve our understanding of the rationale
and actual practice of inﬂation targeting.
In this paper, we investigate motives that can accommodate the observed emphasis
on inﬂation zones rather than point targets and evaluate the performance of such a
policy under uncertainty. Our analysis is normative in nature, simply investigating
rationales as to why it may be sensible for central banks to pursue policies with
inﬂation zone targeting characteristics. Although we draw from actual inﬂation zone
targeting experience for motivation, we do not attempt to provide empirical evidence
1supporting the theory at this stage.
We consider two alternatives that depart from the conventional linear-quadratic
framework in order to motivate inﬂation zones. First, we allow for a zone-quadratic
objective on the part of the policymaker, that is a loss function which assigns quadratic
loss to inﬂation deviations outside an explicit target zone and implies a near zero loss
as long as inﬂation is contained within the zone. As a consequence, if the policy-
maker assigns at least some weight to output stabilization, the output objective will
dominate at times when inﬂation is within the zone but will recede in importance
when inﬂation is outside the zone. Such preferences would also be consistent with an
apparent tendency of central banks to \put out res," that is to react to inﬂation pri-
marily when it becomes a problem but concentrate on other objectives when inﬂation
is under control.1
Second, we consider the possibility of nonlinearities in the short-run inﬂation-output
tradeo. More specically, we allow for the possibility that inﬂation is essentially
stable for a range of output gaps and only increases or decreases materially when
the output gap is outside this range. Translated into unemployment Phillips curve
terms, this implies that instead of a well dened unique NAIRU there exists a range
of unemployment rates over which inﬂation remains essentially stable. Such a \thick"
NAIRU implies a concave-convex-shaped short-run inﬂation-output tradeo. As we
explain, this shape may be motivated based on the recent debate in the empirical
literature over convexity versus concavity of the Phillips curve.2
After showing that these departures from the linear-quadratic framework induce an
optimal policy rule that exhibits a target zone for inﬂation, we proceed to investigate
the implications of uncertainty for inﬂation-zone targeting. It is well known that addi-
tive uncertainty, such as uncertainty due to unexpected demand and price shocks, has
no eect on the optimal policy rule in the conventional linear-quadratic framework.
This result is typically referred to as certainty-equivalence. Inﬂation targeting central
banks however often emphasize the role of uncertainty in relation to target ranges
1Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), for instance, suggest that policymakers appear to pursue multiple
objectives by shifting a large part of their attention to \the variable that is currently `in crisis' " (p.
186).
2See for example Eisner (1997), Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1999), Turner (1995) and others
for estimates of alternative non-linear Phillips curves. Filardo (1998) has recently investigated the
concave-convex-shaped Phillips curve using U.S. data. For a discussion of theoretical motivations for
concave and convex Phillips curves see Stiglitz (1997) and Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998).
2for inﬂation and suggest that the choice of a target range over a point target is inﬂu-
enced by the degree of uncertainty they face. In our framework with non-quadratic
preferences or a nonlinear inﬂation-output tradeo we nd that uncertainty due to
unexpected shocks has important eects on the width of the target zone and on the
relative size of the policy response inside and outside the zone. For example, under
uncertainty the optimal policy does not respond mechanically only when inﬂation
falls outside the zone. Instead, as we illustrate, it is optimal to respond to inﬂation
deviations already within the zone and more aggressively if inﬂation continues to drift
outside the zone. Furthermore, in the case of the zone-linear Phillips curve, the width
of the target zone actually increases with the variance of inﬂation shocks.
Our framework of analysis is a simple macroeconomic model of inﬂation, output and
interest rates with adaptive expectations. Such models have been widely used in the
above literature on monetary policy and inﬂation targeting, but typically the main
focus has been on linear versions with quadratic objectives. We parameterize this
model using alternatively data for the U.S. and for the Euro area. We compute the
dynamically optimal monetary policies using a dynamic programming algorithm that
can accommodate non-linearities in the economic structure, non-quadratic preferences
and uncertainty. Our analysis of inﬂation zone targeting also relates in some respects
to the literature on exchange rate target zones (see, e.g. Krugman 1991). Similar to
the investigation of the dynamic behavior of exchange rates when the central bank
attempts to maintain the exchange rate within an explicit zone in that literature,
our analysis provides information on the dynamic behavior of inﬂation with policy
that has zone characteristics. However, there are important dierences. First, unlike
exchange rates the control of inﬂation is much less direct so strict control of inﬂation
within a xed zone, even if it were desired, would not be feasible. And second,
our objective is to formally explore the rationale for adopting policies with zone
characteristics while the emphasis in the case of exchange rate zones is to investigate
the dynamics once a target zone is imposed on the economy.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the actual
practice of inﬂation-targeting central banks in a bit more detail. Section 3 presents
the linear-quadratic model that we use as a benchmark for comparison. In section 4
we depart from the linear-quadratic model by considering zone-quadratic preferences
as a motive for target zones. Section 5 motivates a target zone based on a nonlinear
Phillips curve. Parameter estimates of the basic model using U.S. and Euro area data
3are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 studies the impact of uncertainty and presents
a comparison of optimal policies in the nonlinear model based on U.S. and Euro area
parameter estimates. Section 8 concludes and the numerical dynamic programming
algorithm that is used for computing dynamically optimal policies is described in the
appendix.
2 Zone versus point targets: policy practice
In addition to announcing numerical inﬂation targets, the inﬂation-targeting central
banks have adopted a complete policy framework that provides a strategy for achiev-
ing their stated goals. This framework has been described in many publications of the
respective central banks and speeches of the policymakers. Very useful and detailed
reviews of the inﬂation-targeting frameworks of New Zealand, Canada, the U.K., Swe-
den and several other countries have been provided by Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Leiderman and Svensson (1995). Here we simply review one aspect of the respective
country's inﬂation targeting framework|namely the choice of a target range versus
a point target for inﬂation and how this choice is motivated.
New Zealand: In 1990, New Zealand became the rst country to adopt a formal
inﬂation targeting framework. The inﬂation target is typically stated as a range
rather than as a point target. The Minister of Finance and the Governor of the
Reserve Bank negotiate and publish a Policy Target Agreement (PTA) that denes
specic targets by which monetary policy performance during the Governor's term can
be measured. The rst PTA in March 1990 dened price stability as annual inﬂation
within a 0 to 2% range. Every 6 months the Reserve Bank publishes a Monetary Policy
Statement. Starting with a target range of 3 to 5% in 1990, subsequent Monetary
Policy Statements dened a path toward price stability by changing the target range
to 2.5 to 4.5% in December 1991, 1.5% to 3.5% in December 1992 and 0 to 2% in
December 1993. The 0 to 2% target of price stability was intended to be a true zone,
with a \hard" ﬂoor and ceiling but with no special emphasis on the mid-point (see
Nicholl and Archer, 1992). At the end of 1996 the target zone was widened from
0% to 2% to 0% to 3% to avoid excessively activist policy responses that would be
required to contain inﬂation in such a narrow band. In 1997 Governor Brash noted
\The tension is between, on the one hand, choosing a target range which eectively
anchors inﬂation expectations at a low level but which is so narrow that it provokes
excessive policy activism and risks loss of credibility by being frequently exceeded;
and on the other, a target range which does a less eective job of anchoring inﬂation
4expectations, but which requires less policy activism and protects credibility by being
rarely breached" (cited in Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 113).
Canada: The Bank of Canada became an inﬂation-targeter one year later in 1991. Its
target denition is similar to the denition of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, in
that it is stated as a range rather than a point target. A target range of +/- 1 % was
set around a midpoint of 3% at the end of 1992, 2.5% by mid-1994 and 2% by the end
of 1995. Bernanke et al. (1999) note that while the objective to be targeted was the
mid-point of the range, in practice, the Bank of Canada never aggressively sought to
move inﬂation from the outer bands toward the midpoints, even when actual inﬂation
lingered at or below the target ﬂoor for an extended period. For example, in 1995 the
Bank's Deputy Governor Charles Freedman, wrote \With inﬂation having fallen to the
bottom of the bands during the past couple of years and seeming likely to remain there
in the near future, the emphasis in the revised targets was put on the inﬂation bands,
thereby indicating that the Bank cannot control inﬂation all that closely" (Freedman,
1995, p. 24). Governor Thiessen also made clear that containing inﬂation within the
zone would involve some countercyclical policy by stating \When weakening demand
threatens to pull inﬂation below the target range, it will be countered by monetary
easing" (Thiessen, 1996, cited in Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 123.)
United Kingdom: The adoption of an inﬂation target in the U.K. was a reaction to
the exit from the European Monetary System in 1992. It was announced by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, who three weeks later invited the
Governor of the Bank of England to publish a quarterly Inﬂation Report. In May
1997 the Bank of England obtained operational independence. Initially the U.K. set
a target range for inﬂation. Since May 1997 the target has been expressed as a point,
but with 1% thresholds on either side. Once inﬂation breaches a target threshold,
the Bank of England is required to provide a formal explanation to the government.
In a recent speech, the chief economist of the Bank, John Vickers, directly addressed
the question of how these thresholds may aect the policymakers' loss function. He
argued that Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) members are no graphophobes, that
is, they have no fear of writing a letter to the Chancellor to explain why the inﬂation
target has been missed by more than 1% (see Vickers, 1998, p. 370).
Sweden: Like the U.K., Sweden adopted an inﬂation target after the 1992 EMS
crisis. As of 1993 the Riksbank dened the target of price stability as keeping the
5annual change in consumer prices at 2 %, with a tolerance interval of +/- 1 %.
The principal reason for the tolerance interval is inﬂation uncertainty, which reﬂects
the imperfect control of monetary policy over the inﬂation rate. Furthermore, the
Riksbank has repeatedly emphasized that target breaches that are perceived to be
transitory would not require policy action. For example, in 1997 the Deputy Governor,
Lars Heikensten, stated, \It is because of temporary eects that the average level of
inﬂation in 1996 is outside the Riksbank's target interval. As a rule, the interval
surrounding the target gure should suce to absorb changes of this type in the
composition of inﬂation" (Heikensten, 1997, cited in Bernanke et al., 1999, p. 197).
In June 1998 the Riksbank's Inﬂation Report noted \Various kinds of transitory
eects have been particularly marked in certain periods. ... The factors that exert
transitory eects on inﬂation and should therefore disregarded in the construction of
monetary policy are not self-evident and may also dier from case to case," (Sveriges
Riksbank, 1998, p. 41).
This review of actual policy practice suggests that most inﬂation-targeting central
banks consider target ranges or tolerance intervals for inﬂation a useful policy tool
within their inﬂation targeting framework.3. Furthermore, some of these central banks
have explicitly stated that the upper and lower bands of such a target range play a
more important role in their strategy than the mid-point and have dierentiated be-
tween policy responses inside and outside the target range. In all cases the target
range or tolerance interval is loosely motivated by the fact that inﬂation outcomes are
uncertain, that is, due to the possibility of unforeseen shocks the central bank cannot
control the inﬂation rate perfectly. Nevertheless, inﬂation targeting central banks
have made clear that they expect the long-run average of inﬂation to be about equal
to the mid-point of the target range or tolerance interval, which suggests that policy
responses above and below the range are expected to be symmetric. Finally, policy-
makers have typically emphasized that target ranges are not pursued in a mechanical
manner. For example, some have pointed out that even when inﬂation breaches one
of the bands, an activist policy response may not be required if the breach is expected
to be of a transitory nature.
Given the wide use of target ranges or zones among inﬂation-targeting central banks,
3Another interesting example is Australia. Rather than choosing a wider target range or a single
point target the Reserve Bank pursues a \thick" point target of \around 2-3% over the medium
term", (Stevens and Debelle, 1995, p.82.)
6we believe that it is important to dierentiate between strategies of inﬂation zone and
inﬂation point targeting. To understand the essence of an inﬂation zone targeting
strategy it is instructive to rst abstract from uncertainty completely and simply
examine how a policymaker would pursue his long-run inﬂation objective, dened
as a numerical target , when faced with an initial inﬂation level that diers from
this target in a deterministic setting. In its purest form, an inﬂation zone targeting
strategy dierentiates the required policy stance depending on whether the inﬂation
rate deviates substantially from the target or is fairly close to it. When inﬂation
deviates substantially from its target, the policymaker takes action towards bringing
inﬂation back closer to its target. However, when inﬂation is fairly close to its target
the policymaker opts not to actively pursue further improvements. This strategy
implicitly denes an inaction zone for inﬂation. Letting z denote the width of this
zone, the strategy implies that as long as current inﬂation is within the range ( −
z=2;+z=2) policy will simply aim to maintain inﬂation at its current setting. And,
of course, as long as inﬂation is maintained in this range, the policymaker will attempt
to maintain a zero output gap and avoid an inﬂationary or disinﬂationary impetus
from aggregate demand.4
In light of the experience of inﬂation-targeting central banks and based on formal
analyses of inﬂation targeting strategies, a number of authors have advocated that
the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank respectively adopt an inﬂation
targeting framework for monetary policy. As to the European Central Bank, the
announcement of a precise, quantitative denition of a medium-term price stability
objective is already a central feature of the ECB's strategy. The ECB has dened
price stability in terms of \price increases of less than two percent". This denition
excludes deﬂation and is symmetric.5 However, the ECB has also made clear that it
does not follow a strategy of direct inﬂation targeting such as the central banks of
New Zealand, Canada, Sweden and the U.K. nor a pure monetary targeting strategy.
Neither of these strategies was judged fully adequate in light of the uncertainty due
to potential structural changes in many economic relationships and the discontinuity
in statistical information following the start of European Monetary Union. For a
thorough discussion of the ECB's strategy and comparisons to inﬂation and monetary
4As we explain later on, implementing an inﬂation zone targeting strategy is more complex in
practice, since uncertainty will have a crucial inﬂuence on the optimal policy response to inﬂation.
5Unlike the maximum, the minimum is not made explicit because of the absence of reliable evi-
dence on the measurement bias that may be associated with the new Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP), (Angeloni et al. 1999).
7targeting the reader is referred to Angeloni, Gaspar and Tristani(1999).
While target ranges appear to be an important tool of inﬂation-targeting central
banks, formal evaluations of inﬂation targeting have typically been based on linear
or linearized models of the economy with a quadratic loss function for the central
bank, which do not provide a rationale for the use of target ranges. Optimal policy in
such a linear-quadratic framework responds linearly to output and inﬂation and other
relevant state variables. Furthermore, uncertainty by itself provides no motive for an
explicit zone, and uncertainty due to unforeseen additive shocks to inﬂation has no
eect at all on the optimal policy response. Thus, the conventional linear-quadratic
framework is at odds with the emphasis put on target ranges by inﬂation-targeting
central banks.6 In the following section we present an example of such a linear-
quadratic model, which we will use as a benchmark in our analysis of inﬂation zone
versus inﬂation point targeting.
3 The L-Q Theory of Inﬂation Point Targeting
We build a minimalist model of the economy following closely the structure of recent
studies examining alternative disinﬂation strategies and ecient monetary policy|
particularly the models in Ball (1999), Orphanides and Wilcox (1996), Orphanides
(1998) and Svensson (1997). The two key variables in the policy decision process are
inﬂation and output and the monetary policy instrument is the short-term nominal
interest rate. Inﬂation is determined by an accelerationist Phillips curve and output
follows a simple autoregressive process. For simplicity the dynamic structure of the
economy is collapsed to a single lag of inﬂation and output and it is therefore appro-
priate to interpret the length of a period in our model to be rather long, perhaps as
long as a year.
The model is chosen for its expositional simplicity and its usefulness for organizing
our results in terms of key concepts frequently encountered in monetary policy dis-
cussions. However, this comes at a cost that we wish to make explicit at the outset.
Specically, our model is not directly based on microeconomic principles and opti-
mizing foundations and abstracts from a number of elements that may be important
6Of course, uncertainty still aects inﬂation outcomes. Thus, central banks may want to commu-
nicate the changing degree of uncertainty associated with inﬂation forecasts, but rather by changing
uncertainty bands as done by the Bank of England and Sveriges Riksbank rather than a xed tar-
get range. Nevertheless, one could argue that a target zone may be a particularly simple way to
communicate an unconditional condence interval for the long-run to the public.
8in practice.7 By abstracting from the explicit modeling of expectations, for instance,
we do not address the intricate interactions between policy design and expectations
formation. We also avoid questions regarding credibility and reputation issues con-
cerning the central bank and the commitment mechanism that might be required for
adopting time-consistent optimal plans. Indeed, with our simplifying assumptions,
the \commitment" and \no commitment" solutions to the policymaker's problem are
identical and correspond to the dynamic programming solution. The main advan-
tage of these simplifying assumptions is that we can focus on the computation of
the dynamically optimal monetary policies using a dynamic programming algorithm
that can accommodate non-linearities in the economic structure, non-quadratic pref-
erences and uncertainty. Computation of such optimal policies in non-linear rational
expectations models, by contrast, is decidedly more complex.
In every period, the policymaker sets the nominal interest rate, R, with the objective
to maintain inﬂation, , close to a desired target consistent with reasonable price
stability, , and output close to the economy's natural level|that is to keep the
output gap, y, close to zero.8 To describe the policymaker's welfare loss during a
period t in terms of the economy's inﬂation and output performance we specify a
per-period loss function, lt = l(t;y t). In practice, since monetary policy operates
with a lag, a policymaker setting policy during period t can have relatively little
inﬂuence on aggregate demand and inﬂation during the same period. As a result, it
is more helpful to view the policy problem as one in which the policymaker sets the
short-term nominal interest rate during period t, Rt, with an aim to inﬂuence the
economy in period t+1 and in later periods. That is, the rst per-period loss relevant
for the policymaker's decision in period t is lt+1. With this in mind, and assuming
that the policymaker discounts the future with a xed discount factor ,w ec a nv i e w
the policymaker's objective in period t as to minimize the expected discounted sum








The policymaker solves this problem subject to the dynamic structure of the economy.
We will assume that the economy can be characterized recursively so that inﬂation and
7Clarida, Gertler and Gali (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Woodford (1999) oer
examples of models with detailed micro-foundations.
8The short nominal interest rate we have in mind as serving the role of a policy instrument
would correspond to the federal funds rate for the Federal Reserve, or the euro-overnight-index-
average (eonia) rate for the European Central Bank, which refers to the weighted average of overnight
(unsecured) rates reported by a panel of large banks in the Euro area.
9output in period t +1 ,( t+1;y t+1) are determined by just three factors: the state of
the economy in the preceding period, that is, inﬂation and output, (t;y t); the policy
choice in period t, Rt; and stochastic shocks to inﬂation and output, (et+1,ut+1), that
are drawn from zero-mean, independent normal distributions in every period. Then,
in period t, the policymaker's problem is to set the policy instrument, Rt, responding
to current inﬂation and output developments, t and yt, so as to minimize the loss
function (1).
In general this setup can accommodate a variety of alternative specications of pref-
erences and economic structures. However, it is not always straightforward to solve
for the policymaker's optimal choice of the policy instrument Rt. The conventional
model employs two additional assumptions regarding preferences and the structure of
the economy that render the problem tractable, namely the assumptions of quadratic
preferences and a linear economy. With these two convenient assumptions, analytical
results from linear{quadratic (L-Q) control theory become applicable and the solution
of the problem is greatly simplied.
Following the conventional setting, we endow the policymaker with symmetric prefer-
ences that are quadratic in both the deviation of inﬂation, , from its desired target,
, and the output deviation from the economy's natural output level, y. The per-
period loss facing a policymaker in period t+1,lt+1, can therefore be expressed as a
weighted average of these two components:
lt+1 = !(t+1 − )2 +( 1− !)y2
t+1 (2)
This specication has two essential characteristics. First, the weight, !,w h i c hi s
assumed to be a xed fraction between zero and one, reﬂects the relative weight a
policymaker places on the objective of stabilizing inﬂation relative to the objective of
stabilizing output. A weight approaching one would reﬂect a policymaker who places
no value on output stabilization, that is an \inﬂation nutter" in the terminology of
King (1997). A weight between zero and one is generally considered more consistent
with the mandate of many central banks to not only maintain price stability but also
facilitate economic growth and welfare over time. Second, the loss is minimized (and
is equal to zero) when inﬂation and the output gap are at their respective bliss levels
of  and zero. This rules out a built-in inﬂationary bias in policymaker preferences
which although present in some theoretical models is considered not applicable for
10the formulation of monetary policy by policymakers themselves.9
In our baseline linear structure, two equations describe the evolution of the economy:
t+1 = t + yt+1 + et+1 (3)
yt+1 = y t −  (rt − r)+ut+1 (4)
where  and  are positive,  2 [0;1), r is the natural real rate of interest and et+1
and ut+1 are the zero-mean normally distributed shocks. The real interest rate is
denoted by rt and dened as the short-term nominal interest rate Rt minus inﬂation:
rt  Rt − t (5)
The equation for the output gap reﬂects a tendency for output to revert to its nat-
ural level when monetary policy is \neutral," and to respond otherwise linearly to
deviations of the real interest rate, rt, from its natural rate, r, with a lag of one pe-
riod. The equation for inﬂation represents a linear accelerationist Phillips curve. An
implicit assumption in our specication is that demand pressures inﬂuence inﬂation
changes contemporaneously.10 With this assumption, policy can have an eect on
both output and inﬂation with a one period lag|that is after one year. This struc-
ture also proves convenient for two other reasons. As will become evident shortly,
this timing allows a particularly simple analytical exposition because it permits a
decoupling of the determination of the inﬂuences of current aggregate demand and
current inﬂation conditions on the optimal setting of the policy instrument. In ad-
dition, with this structure, the solution to the static problem which applies to a
policymaker who is only concerned about the per-period loss lt+1 in the subsequent
period retains the salient characteristics of the solution to the more general innite
horizon case. Finally, by concentrating on the short-term nominal interest rate as the
policy instrument, we do not need to introduce a monetary aggregate explicitly in the
model. An implicit money demand equation is present in the background, of course,
providing a relationship between income, prices and interest rates which determines
9See the discussions by Blinder (1997,1998), King (1997) and Vickers (1999).
10This diers from the timing adopted by Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997) who assume that
aggregate demand inﬂuences inﬂation only with a one period lag. We chose the timing assumption
embedded in Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) and Orphanides (1998) because although as an empirical
matter we agree that aggregate prices do not appear to adjust instantaneously to changes in aggregate
demand, it may not be sensible to rule out any such adjustment for a longer period of time. Since
we interpret the length of a period to be fairly long we nd the assumption of a contemporaneous
response more appealing.
11the necessary money supply that the central bank needs to supply in every period to
achieve the desired setting of the nominal interest rate.
The most direct way to solve this problem is by applying dynamic programming
techniques. Assuming that the policymaker observes the current level of inﬂation,
t, and the current output gap, yt, without error during the period t, those two
variables completely describe the state of the economy. Thus, the solution to the
policymaker's problem implies an optimal policy reaction function that describes how
the policymaker ought to set the policy instrument, Rt, in response to these two state
variables:
Rt = R(t;y t)
However, this problem can be recast in a simpler form that allows us to restate the
policymaker's strategy in terms of a single state variable, which is current inﬂation,
t.
To see this, observe that according to equation (4), in period t the policymaker can
determine the output gap in the subsequent period, yt+1, by setting the nominal
interest rate, Rt, up to the stochastic shock, ut+1: Now let ^ yt+1 denote the intended
output gap that the policymaker attempts to achieve in period t + 1. Equation (4)
indicates that the policymaker can pursue this intended output gap by setting:







The actual output gap can thus be written in terms of the policymaker's intention
and the stochastic shock to the output equation as:
yt+1 =^ yt+1 + ut+1: (7)
As a result the policymaker's choice in period t can be restated in terms of the desired
output gap for the subsequent period, ^ yt+1. Since current period output, yt,d o e sn o t
appear in either the inﬂation equation (3), or in the per-period loss, lt+1, only one
state variable remains, current inﬂation, t. Surely, as is clear from (6), knowing both
state variables, t and yt, remains necessary for setting the nominal interest rate Rt
in order to achieve the desired output gap in period t+1. The dynamic optimization
problem, however, can be solved in terms of a single state, t.
To solve this optimization problem we proceed to write the Bellman equation:
V (t) = min
^ yt+1
Et flt+1 + V(t+1)g (8)
12where the inﬂation equation (3) determines the transition of the state from t to
t+1, equation (2) is employed for the per-period loss, lt+1 and equation (7) is used
to express the actual output gap in period t+1 in terms of the policy intention, ^ yt+1,
which we treat as the control variable. The expectation operator integrates over the
distribution of the stochastic shocks, et+1 and ut+1. As is well known, for our baseline
linear-quadratic case, the value function, V , is quadratic in the state variables itself.
With this information it is straightforward (though somewhat tedious) to obtain the
solution for the optimal policy in closed form. This is:
^ yt+1 = (t − )( 9 )
where  is a function of the parameters of the model. For the general case with a
discount factor  2 (0;1) the solution is:
 =






Ψ=2[4(1 − w)w +( w)2]+( 1− w)(1 − )[(1 − w)(1 − ) − 22w]
The two limiting cases of myopic preferences,  ! 0, and no discounting,  ! 1, are
of independent interest. The no discounting case,  ! 1, is of interest because then
the policymaker's problem becomes equivalent to the minimization of the weighted
asymptotic variances of inﬂation and output. This allows for discussions of policy in
terms of the inﬂation and output variability tradeo.11 In that case the expression




4(1 − w)w +( w)2
2(1 − w)
The myopic case,  ! 0, provides a useful benchmark for comparisons if the policy-
maker in period t attempts to minimize just the period t + 1 loss, lt+1.I nt h a tc a s e ,
the problem collapses to a static one, in which the value function coincides with the
per-period loss function. The resulting expression for  is:
(!0) =
−w
2w +( 1− w)
(11)
As can be seen, the solution retains the salient characteristics of the general case with
discounting. Because of this, examination of the myopic case becomes particularly
11Since its introduction by Taylor (1979), the practice of discussing policy using such variability
tradeos has been adopted in a large number of both academic and policy studies. See for instance,
the contributions in Taylor (1999).
13useful for comparisons with models that deviate from the L-Q framework since in
such models an analytical solution may exist only for the myopic case and not for the
general one.
It is important to note that although we chose to express the policymaker's problem
for period t in terms of the choice of the intended output gap in period t +1 ,t h i s
is merely a convenient analytical device and does not reﬂect on the relative weight
the policymaker places on inﬂation versus output stabilization. Rather it reﬂects the
constraint implicit in the Phillips curve. To see how, it is instructive to dene ^ t+1
as the intended rate of inﬂation for period t + 1 consistent with the policymaker's
intended output gap, ^ yt+1, that is reﬂected in the optimal policy decision taken during
period t. Using the Phillips curve, it is immediate to see that:
^ t+1 = t + ^ yt+1: (12)
Therefore, stating the policymaker's strategy in terms of the intended output gap
and in terms of the intended inﬂation are equivalent. Stated in terms of intended
inﬂation, the optimal policy (9) can be written as:
^ t+1 =( 1+)t − : (13)
This also illustrates that, in general, the policymaker's strategy will reﬂect a gradual
attainment of the inﬂation target, . Although the policymaker can attain this
target within one period, in expectation, only an \inﬂation nutter" would choose to
do so. In that case, i.e. when ! = 1, the optimal policy yields  = −1= and,
therefore, ^ t+1 = , regardless of the level of current inﬂation.
Once the optimal choice of the intended output gap for t+1 is determined, equation
(6) provides the optimal interest rate rule in terms of the two state variables, t and
yt. In our baseline model this takes the form of the Taylor rule with a positive nominal
interest rate response to the output gap and a response to inﬂation that exceeds one
(note that <0).






(t − ) (14)
A pertinent characteristic of this strategy is that the optimal policy sets the interest
rate, and thus the intended output gap, proportionally to the inﬂation gap, i.e. the
inﬂation deviation from its desired target, . In this sense, the optimal policy
14in the L-Q model requires the policymaker to pursue the price stability objective
gradually but persistently. However large or small the inﬂation gap may be, this
policy suggests that the policymaker should actively pursue policies towards closing
it. And the intensity with which this objective is pursued is always proportional to
the gap that is to be closed. Exactly because of this property, the L-Q framework
appears unsuitable for investigating the rationale for inﬂation zone targeting policies.
In the next two sections we investigate instead deviations from the L-Q framework
that can help us understand the rationale for target zones.
A nal important observation is that the optimal policy in the L-Q model is indepen-
dent of the variance of the shocks to the output and inﬂation equations. Of course,
this simply reﬂects the validity of the certainty equivalence principle in this setting.
By contrast, as we shall see later on, the inﬂuence of uncertainty plays an impor-
tant role in determining optimal policy once we deviate from the conventional L-Q
framework.
Surely, the presence of uncertainty does aect the resulting inﬂation and output vari-
ability. With greater uncertainty, inﬂation will deviate more frequently and more
substantially from its target, . It is sometimes suggested that one potential role for
an inﬂation range is as a communication device that can be employed by policymakers
to acknowledge the imperfect control of inﬂation from period to period and provide
an indication of the magnitude of this uncertainty. For instance, a range could be
specied so as to reﬂect a one standard deviation band from the policymaker's in-
tended inﬂation, ^ t+1. However, to serve this purpose, an inﬂation range would need
to be adjusted period by period to reﬂect both changes in this uncertainty as well as
changes in the policymaker's intended inﬂation rate, ^ t+1, which, from (13), changes
period by period with actual inﬂation, t. But a more straightforward and transpar-
ent way to communicate such uncertainty would be by providing explicit information
regarding the probability distribution of the policymaker's intended inﬂation rate,
^ t+1.12 The potential for providing information regarding uncertainty within the
12The probability distribution presented in the form of a fan chart in the Bank of England's
Inﬂation Report provides a nice example of this more straightforward and transparent way to com-
municate inﬂation forecast uncertainty. More recently, Sweden's Riksbank has also started publishing
uncertainty bands that reﬂect the uncertainty about shocks that will aect the economy as well as
uncertainty about both the qualitative and quantitative nature of the transmission mechanism (see
Blix and Sellin (1998)). Of course, these uncertainty bands change over time and dier from the +/-1
percentage point tolerance band around the Riksbank's 2% target. However, because the inﬂation
forecasts presented by the Bank of England and the Riksbank are conditioned on the assumption
that the short-term nominal interest rate will remain unchanged, they do not exactly correspond to
15L-Q framework does not provide a very useful rationale for an inﬂation target range.
4 Non-quadratic preferences and inﬂation zone targeting
The rst deviation from the linear-quadratic paradigm that we examine involves the
policymaker's preferences. Specically, we relax the assumption that the per-period
loss faced by the policymaker is quadratic and instead examine an alternative that
can provide a partial rationale for inﬂation zone targeting.
To be sure, a quadratic loss function may approximate the policymaker's preferences
reasonably well around the point where the approximation is taken. But it does not
follow that the same quadratic function can provide a reasonable approximation over
the wide range of actual inﬂation experiences policymakers face over time. This is not
meant to suggest that we can accurately uncover the correct functional form of the
policymaker's preferences. We most certainly recognize the complexities involved in
such a task. Rather, we want to illustrate how plausible alternatives to the quadratic
preference paradigm may have rather dierent implications for the optimal policy
response to small and large deviations of inﬂation from a point inﬂation target. In a
sense, we wish to explore the possibility of a preference for inﬂation-zone targeting.
The intuition behind these alternatives is based on comparing the order of the cost
of small departures of output from its bliss level and that of small departures of
inﬂation from its target. If the former is larger than the latter, it may be sensible
for the policymaker to ignore small deviations of inﬂation from its target rather than
incur the higher order costs required to bring inﬂation back to its target. With a
loss function that is quadratic in inﬂation and output, the order of costs for small
deviations from target are equal (quadratic) for both inﬂation and output. But there
are reasons to suspect that this may not be entirely realistic.
One reason is the indivisibility of labor employment decisions. For much of the
workforce, employment is an all-or-nothing proposition. An individual may be either
employed full-time or unemployed. Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) have argued that
as a consequence of this indivisibility, even small deviations from full employment
impose rst order costs on a policymaker who aggregates over individual welfare. As
a consequence, even if the loss function is quadratic in inﬂation deviations from its
our concept of the policymaker's intended inﬂation, ^ t+1, which also reﬂects the intended movements
of the interest rate.
16desired target, the optimal policy exhibits inﬂation zone targeting characteristics.13
A second reason arises from the very rationale for valuing price stability. Typically,
policymakers value maintaining inﬂation at a low and stable target such as zero,
one or two percent, not because low inﬂation raises welfare in itself but because a
low and stable inﬂation environment indirectly enhances welfare by promoting stable
economic growth, and by reducing resource allocation distortions and ineciencies.
Consequently, these indirect costs of inﬂation must be understood and evaluated
before forming a judgment regarding the functional form that best approximates the
policymaker's loss with respect to inﬂation.
While there is wide-spread agreement on the deleterious eects of high inﬂation and
rapid deﬂation, the eects of a marginal change in inﬂation near price stability are
not as clear.14 As a result, it seems plausible to specify a per-period loss of inﬂation
which allows for a range|instead of just a single point|over which the policymaker's
loss is not materially inﬂuenced by marginal changes in inﬂation. For instance, we
could entertain the possibility that the per-period losses at zero, one or two percent
inﬂation are essentially equal to each other with the per-period costs rising only as
inﬂation veers outside this range. It is important to clarify that this comparison
applies only to the per-period loss from inﬂation, not the innite discounted sum of
per-period losses that the policymaker aims to minimize. Even if zero, one and two
percent inﬂation are equally costly in any given period, a policymaker might still
exhibit a preference for one percent over zero if that reduces the risk of veering into
costly deﬂation in subsequent periods, and might still prefer one percent over two
if that reduces the risk of veering into the higher levels of inﬂation that are clearly
detrimental to the economy. Indeed, this distinction is critical for understanding the
implications of this type of preferences for the practice of inﬂation zone targeting.
One way to model such a non-quadratic loss while simultaneously nesting the quadratic
specication, (2), as a special case, is with the per-period loss:
lt+1 = !Z(t+1 − ;)2 +( 1− !)y2
t+1 (15)
13Clarida, Gertler and Gali (1999) and Orphanides, Small, Wieland and Wilcox (1997) have inves-
tigated this mechanism further.
14Fischer and Modigliani (1978), and Fischer (1981) provide taxonomies of the costs of inﬂation.
Orphanides and Solow (1990) document that theoretical arguments regarding the costs and benets
of inﬂation in the monetary growth literature are inconclusive. Empirical research by Clark (1997),
Judson and Orphanides (1999), and Sarel (1996), suggests that moderate and high inﬂation have a
negative eect on growth but nds no evidence of a clear relationship at very low levels of inﬂation.
17where Z(:;) is a zone-generating function that is approximately zero within a range
of width  and linear outside this range. The following specication for Z, based on






















Here,  is a parameter controlling the width of the zone generated by the function
and c is a smoothness parameter we set equal to a small positive number.15 In the
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This limit also claries that the zone disappears as  ! 0, Z(x;0;c)=x,a n dt h el o s s
function (15) collapses to the quadratic case.
Given this relationship to the quadratic per-period loss, we refer to the loss function
in (15) as zone-quadratic. Figure 1 compares the per-period loss due to inﬂation
for the quadratic and zone-quadratic specication. As shown, the zone quadratic
form exhibits a width equal to two percent. Thus, if the point inﬂation target in the
quadratic loss is one percent, the zone quadratic loss implies that per-period losses
due to inﬂation are essentially the same within the zero to two percent range we
mentioned earlier in our example and only rise materially when the inﬂation rate is
above 2% or below 0%.
To examine the implications of such preferences for the optimal policy response to
inﬂation, we solve the policymaker's optimization problem described in section (3)
substituting the quadratic loss function (2) with the zone-quadratic specication (15)
while maintaining the assumption of a linear structure of the economy. Figure 2 pro-
vides a rst comparison of the solutions to the linear-quadratic (L-Q) and linear-zone-
quadratic (L-ZQ) models for a specic but representative set of parameters values.
Importantly, this comparison rests on the assumption that the policymaker is faced
with a deterministic problem, that is we assume that the variances of the shocks in
the inﬂation and output equations, e and u, are equal to zero. While this assumption
is immaterial for the optimal policy in the L-Q model, the presence of uncertainty
does inﬂuence the characteristics of the optimal policy once we deviate from the L-Q
15When we compute optimal policies numerically we use c =0 :1, throughout.
18model. Thus, we proceed in two steps; rst abstracting from the eects of uncertainty
and then incorporating them later on.
The four panels in Figure 2 show the optimal policy response to inﬂation deviations
from the target, , for alternative values of the discount factor, ,a n dt h er e l a t i v e
weight on inﬂation stabilization, !, in the policymaker's preferences. In the top row
we show the myopic case,  = 0, while in the bottom row we employ a discount factor
 =0 :9. The right column shows optimal policy for inﬂation nutters, ! = 1, while the
left column corresponds to the more balanced case with ! =0 :5. In each panel, the
thin-solid lines show the optimal policy for the L-Q model and the thick-dotted line
the corresponding policy for the L-ZQ model. The latter policies are approximated
numerically using the dynamic programming algorithm described in the appendix.
Each dot corresponds to a grid point in the approximation. The zone parameter  is
set to two percent (as in Figure 1).
As one would expect, the relative curvature of the output and inﬂation loss in the
policymaker's preferences does not matter for the optimal policy when the policy-
maker is only concerned with inﬂation deviations from target. As the two panels in
the right column indicate, when ! = 1 the optimal policy is the same in the L-Q and
L-ZQ models and is also independent of the policymaker's discounting factor.16 An
important implication is that the optimal policy only exhibits inﬂation zone targeting
characteristics if the policymaker also values output stabilization. This becomes evi-
dent once we move away from this extreme case and allow for some weight on output
stabilization. As shown in the two panels in the left column when ! =0 :5, the L-ZQ
model exhibits clear inﬂation zone targeting behavior.
Another relevant observation is that regardless of the discount factor, the width of
the zone remains the same. This width is determined by the parameter  in the zone-
quadratic loss function. The role of discounting, on the other hand, becomes clear if
inﬂation is outside this zone of inaction. In that situation, policymakers who place
more weight on future performance take more aggressive action to bring inﬂation
back within the tolerable bounds implied by the inﬂation zone.
Of course, compared to the actual practice of inﬂation targeting central banks which
16This holds for any positive value of the smoothness parameter, c, however small. In the extreme
case c = 0, however, the optimal policy is ill dened when ! =1 .T h i s ,i nt u r n ,i sas p e c i a lr e s u l t
that vanishes once uncertainty is introduced in the model.
19make use of target ranges of inﬂation, the optimal policy in the L-ZQ model discussed
above implements the target range rather mechanically. However, this is only because
so far we have abstracted from uncertainty. Later on, we also report more realistic,
less mechanical cases of inﬂation zone targeting that also account for uncertainty
in the inﬂation and output equations. Before doing so, however, we examine yet
another deviation from the L-Q paradigm that suggests a reason why optimal policy
may exhibit inﬂation zone targeting characteristics.
5 Non-linear economy and inﬂation zone targeting
The second deviation from the linear-quadratic paradigm that we examine involves
the structure of the economy. Specically, we relax the assumption that the inﬂation
process is accurately described by a linear accelerationist Phillips curve. Instead
we investigate an alternative specication that can provide a partial rationale for
inﬂation zone targeting even under the hypothesis that policymaker preferences can
be reasonably approximated with a quadratic loss function.
Our purpose is not to dispute the usefulness of the powerful presumption of linearity
in modeling economic structures. Econometric estimation of macroeconomic models
with the limitations of the available time series data is a daunting task even maintain-
ing linearity. Consequently, when it is sucient to work with a linear approximation,
the presumption of linearity may be well advised|even when the underlying struc-
ture of the economy is non-linear. However, the potential of non-linearities should not
be ignored in investigating optimal strategies for monetary policy when the presence
of non-linearities may drastically alter the optimal policy response to inﬂation. Of
course, we do not wish to suggest condence in the presence of non-linearities in the
Phillips curve. Our purpose is merely to investigate the consequences of deviating
from the presumption of linearity for the design of optimal policy.
In the case of a Phillips curve such as the one we specied in equation (3) this issue
is particularly important because it is the source of a fundamental short-run tradeo
facing policymakers. The slope of the Phillips curve in the linear specication, ,
determines the \sacrice ratio", that is, the average cost that a policymaker faces for
closing a gap between inﬂation and its desired target measured in terms of output
deviations from the economy's potential. The presumption of linearity implies that
the sacrice ratio is independent of the size of an intended change in inﬂation in any
given period. Equivalently in a dynamic setting, the sacrice ratio is independent of
20the speed at which a policymaker opts to close an inﬂation gap of given size.
By contrast, if the Phillips curve is non-linear, the sacrice ratio varies with the size of
the intended change in inﬂation during a period and thus with the speed of bringing
inﬂation back to its target. This introduces another margin in the policymaker's con-
siderations for designing optimal policy. Specically, if the sacrice ratio associated
with larger per-period changes in inﬂation is smaller than the corresponding sacrice
ratio associated with smaller per-period changes, a policymaker can economize on
the total cost of disinﬂation by avoiding a slow and protracted strategy that closes
an inﬂation gap in small steps and instead pursuing bigger per-period improvements.
And, for the same reason, if the costs of smaller intended changes in inﬂation imply
increasingly larger sacrice ratios, a policymaker may opt against incurring the rel-
atively large average output loss that would be required for closing small inﬂation
gaps altogether. This suggests that the optimal policy will deviate from linearity in
this case.
Since the slope of the Phillips curve is inversely related to the sacrice ratio, this
argument suggests that the design of optimal policy may exhibit inﬂation zone tar-
geting characteristics if the Phillips curve is ﬂatter in the case of a small output gap
than in the case of a large output gap. A number of reasons suggest that this devi-
ation from linearity may be a reasonable one. When output exceeds the economy's
potential, the inﬂationary tendencies of capacity constraints on prices suggest that
the Phillips curve is considerably steeper when production far exceeds potential com-
pared to when excess demand pressures are more benign. This argument implies that
the Phillips curve may be convex|especially when the output gap is positive.17
On the other hand, as Stiglitz (1997) has pointed out, in monopolistically competitive
markets producers may exhibit increasingly greater willingness to adjust prices down-
wards under conditions of weak demand to avoid being undercut by rival rms. This
suggests that the Phillips curve may be concave|especially when output falls below
its potential.18 Ball's (1994) investigation of the output cost of disinﬂations based
17Starting with Baily (1978) a number of authors have studied the policy implications of such
a convexity in accelerationist Phillips curves. Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993) specically caution
against formulating policy based on the presumption of linearity when the Phillips curve may be
convex. Turner (1995), Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1999) and others have presented evidence
suggesting a convex shape for several European countries and the U.S.. Finally, Phillips' (1958)
original formulation also exhibited a convex shape.
18Eisner (1997) presents empirical evidence for such a concave Phillips curve specication for the
U.S..
21on data for OECD countries, provides additional support for this view as his results
indicate that the sacrice ratio associated with quick disinﬂations is substantially
smaller than the sacrice ratio associated with more gradual disinﬂations.
Although these alternatives suggesting convex and concave Phillips curves may ap-
pear conﬂicting at rst, in fact they could be consistent with a Phillips curve that is
concave when the output gap is negative and convex when the output gap is positive.
Filardo (1998) has recently presented evidence for this possibility in the U.S.19 Such a
concave-convex relationship between economic activity and inﬂation is also consistent
with discussions regarding the relation of wages and employment pre-dating Phillips'
(1958) formulation of the Phillips curve. As documented in Humphrey (1986), Sul-
tan (1957) presented a concave-convex relationship between unemployment and wage
inﬂation suggesting a range of unemployment consistent with near-price stability.
Earlier, Tobin's (1955) model of business cycle dynamics dened a ﬂoor and a ceiling
on the level of employment with the property that while prices remained fairly stable
within these bounds, veering outside those bounds resulted in deﬂation or inﬂation.
Again, we do not wish to suggest that one could condently presume that the Phillips
curve exhibits such non-linearities. Gordon (1997), for instance, maintains that in the
U.S. the Phillips curve is \resolutely linear" (p. 26). However, if the Phillips curve
does exhibit a concave-convex shape, then its slope will be smaller when the economy
is near its potential than when the economy is far away from that level|exactly the
deviation from linearity which introduces inﬂation zone targeting characteristics in
optimal monetary policy.
To illustrate the consequences of a concave-convex shaped Phillips curve for optimal
policy, we examine a particularly simple deviation from linearity that nests the lin-
ear specication as a special case. Using the zone-generating function Z dened in
equation (16), we consider:
t+1 = t + Z(yt+1;)+et+1 (17)
This specication implies that inﬂation remains essentially stable for a whole range of
output gap values with width , instead of only when the output gap is exactly zero|
as is the case in the linear model. Outside this range the Phillips curve maintains its
19Filardo also observed that some of the apparently conﬂicting results on the shape of the Phillips
curve may be due to the fact that many authors impose non-linear specications for the Phillips
curve that rule out the possibility of the concave-convex shape.
22usual linear shape. Like the linear Phillips curve, this specication also maintains the
symmetry property of the model.20 Finally, when  = 0, this specication collapses to
the linear case. In the following we will refer to the specication in (17) as zone-linear.
Figure 3 compares the linear and zone-linear Phillips curves. In the example drawn,
the width of the zone, , is assumed to be three percent. Thus, according to this spec-
ication, deviations of output from its potential do not exert a noticeable inﬂuence
on inﬂation as long as they do not exceed one and a half percent, in absolute value.
As drawn, the zone-linear Phillips curve is also steeper than the linear Phillips curve
once the output gap veers outside the range of stability. As we will show in section
6, this feature is consistent with simple estimates of zone-linear and linear Phillips
curves based on U.S and Euro area data.
To examine the implications of this deviation from the linear-quadratic paradigm, we
solve the policymaker's optimization problem described in section 3 substituting the
linear Phillips curve, (3) with the zone-linear specication (17) while maintaining the
assumption of quadratic preferences. Figure 4 provides an initial comparison of the
solutions to the linear-quadratic (L-Q) and zone-linear-quadratic (ZL-Q) models for
the same representative set of parameter values as in section 3. Regarding the Phillips
curves, the parameters for both, the linear and zone-linear specication, correspond
to the values in gure 3. As with our initial comparisons of the L-Q and L-ZQ models
in the previous section, we set the variance of the shocks in the inﬂation and output
equations, e and u, to zero. Also in parallel with that comparison, we show optimal
policies for the four combinations of values for  and ! that we examined there.
Starting with the right column which shows optimal policy for \inﬂation nutters",
! = 1, again we note that the discount factor becomes irrelevant. As before, the
optimal policy is to attempt to bring inﬂation back to its target within one period.
Since the tradeo facing the policymaker is not the same in the L-Q and ZL-Q models,
however, the policy that can achieve this goal is dierent. With a zone-linear Phillips
curve, a substantial opening of the output gap becomes necessary to restore inﬂation
to its target, even if the inﬂation gap is fairly small. Consequently, the optimal
strategy for an \inﬂation nutter" in the ZL-Q model exhibits a substantially greater
propensity for output variability than in the L-Q paradigm. Even a tiny inﬂation
20Asymmetries, of course, would introduce an additional element of complexity. For instance the
average level of output is no longer independent from its variance in that case.
23deviation is met with a substantial policy move.
Turning to the more balanced preferences with ! =0 :5, reveals how the ZL-Q model
provides a rationale for inﬂation zone targeting behavior. With a zone-linear Phillips
curve, the policymaker opts not to make any progress on the inﬂation front as long as
inﬂation is contained within a certain distance from the ultimate target, . Perhaps
the most striking element of the zone-targeting behavior in the ZL-Q model is the
discontinuity of the optimal policy function at the bounds of the optimal inﬂation
zone.21 Qualitatively, this element of the optimal policy is the same regardless of
the policymaker's discount rate. However, the width of the zone is quite sensitive
to the degree of discounting. A myopic policymaker (top left panel) would tolerate
inﬂation deviations from target exceeding ve percentage points while a policymaker
discounting the future (bottom left panel) would only tolerate deviations of about
one percentage point before taking corrective action.
6 Model parameters for the U.S. and the Euro area
The two deviations from the conventional L-Q model that we have just examined help
us identify possible rationales for adopting monetary policy strategies with inﬂation
zone targeting characteristics. However, to assess the practical signicance of these
departures from the L-Q framework for optimal monetary policy, we need to conduct
such comparisons with alternative models using reasonable parameter values and
appropriate measures of the uncertainty policymaker's are faced with due to shocks
to inﬂation and output. To obtain such parameter values for the simple output and
inﬂation equations that dene our model we estimate least squares regressions using
annual historical data for the U.S. and the Euro area, by which we refer to the 11
countries that have adopted the Euro as of January 1, 1999.22 For the U.S. we
concentrate on the period from 1960 to 1998. For the Euro area, data limitations
restrict us to a shorter period|from 1976 to 1998.
We emphasize that given the simplicity of the dynamic structure of the model we do
not wish to suggest that our parameterization could accurately capture the complex
21Technically the optimal policy is not a function but a correspondence. At the bounds of the zone
dened by the policy, the policymaker is indierent between taking no action against inﬂation and
making concrete progress. With a concave-convex Phillips curve, the Euler equation determining
the rst order conditions of the value function optimization exhibits multiple zeros whose ranking
switches as inﬂation crosses over the bounds of the zone.
22Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. The European System of Central Banks also includes the central banks of the EU countries
which have not yet adopted the Euro as national currency, Denmark, England, Greece and Sweden.
24dynamics as could be described, for instance, by a more detailed quarterly model.
Rather, our goal here is merely to provide guidance as to the rough quantitative
magnitudes relating to the policy problem we explore. Further, unlike our theoretical
formulation of the policy problem, the relevant empirical measures of inﬂation, the
output gap and the interest rate are far from obvious. Thus, it must be understood
that the parameter values which we obtain very much depend on the concepts we
employ and are limited by the accuracy of the underlying data.
For inﬂation we use the annual percentage change in the output deﬂator (Q4/Q4 ba-
sis). For the Euro area this measure is obtained by aggregating data for the individual
Euro area countries. For the output gap we rely on data from the Congressional Bud-
get Oce (CBO) for the U.S. and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) for the Euro area.23 Since the methodologies for constructing
these output gap series dier we also try to indicate the importance of this dierence
for our parameters. To do this, we report additional model estimates based on an
output gap for the U.S. provided by the OECD for the 1976-1998 period and com-
pare those estimates with another set based on the CBO series for the same sample.
Estimation of the output equation also requires data on the nominal interest rate
minus inﬂation. For the U.S. we employ the annual average of the federal funds rate,
deﬂated by the annual rate of inﬂation measured as the percent change in the output
deﬂator on a Q4/Q4 basis. For the Euro area, identifying a comparable historical
series for interest rates is more problematic since monetary policy diered in the indi-
vidual countries. Although it is possible to construct an aggregate historical interest
rate using comparable rates for the individual countries, it is not entirely clear how
to best aggregate these data. While output may be aggregated using relative GDP
weights, the weights for the interest rate that are most appropriate for the output
equation should reﬂect the relative importance of the individual country interest rates
for inﬂuencing aggregate demand in all of the Euro area. Since German monetary
policy served as a de facto anchor to several of the other Euro area countries over
much of the historical sample, we decided to use German interest rates as an appro-
priate proxy for the Euro area.24 Specically we use the German call money rate
deﬂated by the annual rate of inﬂation measured as the percent change in the output
23See Congressional Budget Oce (1999) and Giorno et al. (1995).
24Peersman and Smets (1999) provide supporting arguments for this choice.
25deﬂator for Germany on a Q4/Q4 basis.
Table 1 presents the parameter estimates for the output equation. All variables in
the regression are measured in percent. Our baseline estimate for the Euro area with
data from 1976 to 1998 is shown in column (1). Our baseline for the U.S. with data
from 1960 to 1998 using the CBO measure of the output gap is shown in column (4).
Columns (2) and (3) show the alternative estimates for the U.S. using the OECD and
CBO concepts from 1976 to 1998. As can be seen, the point estimates for both, the
persistence parameter,  and the interest elasticity, , dier by sample and area. By
these estimates, the output gap exhibits greater persistence in the Euro area than in
the U.S. and also a greater sensitivity to interest rate changes. The residual variance
is much smaller for the Euro area than for the U.S.. Comparing columns (2) and (3),
estimated for the common 1976-1998 period for the U.S. using the OECD and CBO
measures of the output gap, respectively, illustrate how much the choice of output
gap measure can inﬂuence the parameters of the model.
Next we obtain parameters for the inﬂation equation. For the same four sample/area
combinations we examined for the output equation in Table 1, Table 2 presents esti-
mates of the parameters of the Phillips curve. In the top panel we show parameter
values obtained under the assumption that the Phillips curve is linear. The slope
parameter for the Euro area (column 1) and our baseline U.S. sample (column 4) do
not dier by much. Both imply a sacrice ratio of about 3. That is, maintaining the
linearity assumption, each additional opening of the output gap by three percentage
points changes inﬂation by one percent. We use these parameters in our L-Q and
L-ZQ models.
The bottom panel shows parameter values for the zone-linear specication that we use
in the ZL-Q model. Here, in addition to the slope parameter, we need a parameter for
the width of the zone over which inﬂation is not materially inﬂuenced by changes in
the output gap. To let the data provide information on what an appropriate value for
this width might be, we estimated regressions with alternative zone widths, starting
with  = 0 and raising it in 0.1 increments. We then selected the width that resulted
in the smallest sum of squared errors. The parameters in the table report the resulting
width and slope parameters. To note, this procedure nests the linear specication
since it includes the estimate with a zone width  =0 :0. The data suggest that
the zone-linear specication does yield a smaller sum of squared errors although the
26dierence can be very small.25 However, we do not intend these simple regressions to
serve as a horse race between the linear and zone-linear specications. Our purpose
is merely to obtain comparable parameters we can then employ to highlight the
policy implications of the dierence between the two alternatives. The uncertainty
associated with estimating Phillips Curves is substantial.26
Using the OECD concept of the output gap suggests a width of about two percent for
both the Euro area and the U.S.. With the CBO concept of the output gap, the data
suggest a width of about three percent for the U.S.. To some extent, this dierence
may reﬂect the fact that the OECD measured output gap is less variable than its
CBO counterpart. An important feature is that in every case, the parameter for the
Phillips curve slope outside the zone is much larger, about twice as large than the
corresponding parameter for the linear Phillips curve.
Figures 5 and 6 show the underlying data and parameterized linear and zone-linear
Phillips curves for the U.S. and Euro area respectively. The gures highlight the
dierences that result from the two models for the shape of the short-run policy
tradeo. Furthermore, they provide visual conrmation that it is dicult to ascertain
from the data which one of the two forms may be the more appropriate approximation
of this tradeo.
7 Inﬂation Zone Targeting under Uncertainty
As discussed earlier, central banks that employ target ranges or tolerance levels in the
design of their inﬂation targeting framework typically motivate these zones by point-
ing to uncertainty and the imperfect controllability of inﬂation. In the conventional
L-Q framework, of course, uncertainty, if it is additive has no eect on the optimal
policy, and even if it is multiplicative in nature, it does not change the intrinsic lin-
earity of the optimal policy response. This property no longer obtains in the cases
of the zone-quadratic preferences or zone-linear Phillips curves discussed in sections
4a n d5 .
In what follows we investigate the impact of uncertainty due to the price shocks,
et+1, in the inﬂation equation (3) or (17), and due to the demand shocks, ut+1,i n
25Alternatively, we could have reported estimates based on non-linear least-squares. The point
estimates for  are nearly identical to the ones we report in the four columns of the Table and their
corresponding t-statistics are 1.8, 1.6, 2.0 and 2.0.
26See also Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997a,b) for a discussion of the diculties involved in
estimating Phillips Curves and the implications for monetary policy.
27the output gap equation (4) on the optimal inﬂation zone targeting strategy. We
proceed in steps, rst introducing only price shocks and then both types of shocks in
the model with zone-quadratic preferences and then applying the same procedure to
the model specication with the zone-linear Phillips curve.
As baseline parameter values for the inﬂation and output gap equations we use the
parameter estimates based on annual U.S. data from 1960 to 1998 with potential
output as measured by the Congressional Budget Oce, which were reported in the
fourth column of Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. In fact, the optimal policies under
certainty that were presented in gures 2 and 4 in the preceding sections were based
on those same parameter estimates. Later on we will also compute optimal policies
using the parameter estimates based on Euro-area data. In these experiments we
concentrate on the case with  =0 :9a n d! =0 :5.
Another question is how to obtain estimates of the variance of the demand and
price shocks. One option would be to use the standard error of the estimate from the
respective regression in Tables 1 and 2 that is based on annual data. However, such an
estimate would severely overstate the degree of uncertainty faced by the policymaker
that is due to unforeseen shocks. In practice, central banks continuously update
their information about output and inﬂation throughout the year and can base their
estimate on many other variables in addition to lags of output and inﬂation. In the
following we use one-half the standard error of the estimated regressions as a measure
of the uncertainty due to price and demand shocks. Of course, the choice of one-half
is somewhat arbitrary. Some sensitivity analysis is provided in a later section in form
of a comparison between the Euro area and the U.S., since the respective regression
equations have dierent standard errors.
Zone-quadratic preferences
The upper panel of gure 7 shows optimal policies under uncertainty due to price
shocks alone, while the lower panel shows the policies that result under uncertainty
due to price and demand shocks together. As previously, the horizontal axis cor-
responds to the observed inﬂation gap, while the vertical axis denotes the intended
or expected output gap in the next period that would result given the interest rate
set by the policymaker. As a benchmark for comparison the thin solid line in each
panel depicts the optimal policy response for the L-Q specication. It is computed
analytically, based on equation (10) and has, of course, exactly the same slope in
28both panels because it is unaected by the degree of uncertainty. Optimal poli-
cies under zone-quadratic preferences are computed numerically using the numerical
dynamic programming algorithm described in the appendix. The dashed curve in
each panel repeats the dynamically optimal policy with zone-quadratic preferences
under certainty from gure 2. The optimal policy under uncertainty is represented
by the dotted curve with every dot corresponding to a grid point of the numerical
approximation.
A comparison of the dashed and dotted curves in the upper panel shows that the
inaction zone, which results from zone-quadratic preferences in the perfect certainty
case, disappears once the possibility of unforeseen price shocks is taken into account.
Instead, the optimal policy in the presence of such shocks is smoother and responds
immediately to small deviations of inﬂation even though the policymaker is endowed
with zone-quadratic preferences. Nevertheless, the optimal policy still exhibits a
region of \zone-like" behavior. As inﬂation deviates more and more from the target
rate, policy responds more than proportionally to inﬂation and the intended output
gap increases more than proportionally with the inﬂation gap. This region of \zone-
like" behavior is about as wide as the 2 % zone that is embodied in the policymaker's
preferences. A comparison of the dashed and dotted curves in the lower panel shows
that the inclusion of demand uncertainty further increases the smoothness of the
policy response to small inﬂation deviations in the \zone-like" region.
The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward. In a world with uncertainty due
to unforeseen shocks there is always some probability that a shock pushes inﬂation
outside the range of inﬂation gaps over which the policymaker with zone-quadratic
preferences perceives no relevant welfare loss. To reduce the likelihood of inﬂation
falling outside this zone, the policymaker is willing to open up small output gaps even
though inﬂation is still inside the zone. This result is very much consistent with the
practice of central banks who use target ranges but typically emphasize that these
ranges are not implemented in a mechanical manner.
Zone-linear Phillips curve
Figure 8 reports the outcome of a similar exercise under the assumption of a zone-
linear Phillips curve. Again, the optimal policy for the L-Q framework is depicted
by a thin solid line, the optimal policy under perfect certainty in the case of a zone-
linear Phillips curve is represented by the dashed curve and the optimal policy under
29uncertainty is represented by the dotted curve.
A comparison of the dashed and dotted curves in the upper panel of Figure 8 reveals
an interesting eect of uncertainty due to unexpected price shocks on the optimal
policy. The width of the inaction zone increases with the variance of the price shocks.
While the optimal policy under perfect certainty exhibits a zone of a little less than
+/- 1%, the optimal policy response which takes into account the possibility of price
shocks exhibits an inaction zone that is almost twice as large. The intuition for this
result is a bit more complicated. First, as pointed out before, in the case of a zone-
linear Phillips curve the sacrice ratio declines with the size of the output gap. In
fact, if the short-run Phillips curve is completely ﬂat in some neighborhood of the
natural rate, opening up a small output gap has no eect on inﬂation. Thus, it is
not worthwhile to move to oset small inﬂation deviations from target. Furthermore,
any policy move against larger inﬂation gaps needs to incur a xed initial cost in
terms of the output gap to reach an output level that results in a disinﬂationary
or inﬂationary impulse. A policymaker who takes into account the possibility of
unexpected shocks to inﬂation, realizes that even in the case of a somewhat larger
inﬂation gap, there is some probability that inﬂation will be driven back towards
the target by an unexpected shock in a subsequent period. Thus, he is a bit more
reluctant to incur the xed initial cost in terms of the output gap that is needed to
return inﬂation to target by policy action. In other words, the xed cost creates an
option value to wait which will be larger the larger the variance of shocks to the price
level. As a consequence, the optimal inaction zone increases with the variance of price
shocks. This result is closely related to the option value of postponing irreversible
investment decisions (see, e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The lower panel in gure 8 shows the optimal policies in the presence of price and
demand shocks. Adding demand uncertainty results in a smoother policy response in
the case of the zone-linear Phillips curve. Thus, just as in the case of zone-quadratic
preferences under uncertainty, the somewhat mechanical inaction zone is replaced by
\zone-like" behavior over a region of inﬂation gaps. The size of the region over which
a \zone-like" policy response is optimal, however, is not sensitive to the variance of
demand shocks.
Inﬂation zone targeting in the U.S. and the Euro area: a simple illustration
Next we put all the dierent ingredients analyzed so far, zone-quadratic preferences,
30a zone-linear Phillips curve, inﬂation uncertainty and demand uncertainty, together
and compute optimal policies using the parameters estimated from annual U.S. data
(CBO potential, 1960-98) and from annual Euro area data (OECD potential, 1976-
98). As a measure of the variance of output and inﬂation shocks we use again half the
standard error of the estimated equations. It should be emphasized that one should
approach the results of this exercise with caution. Given the extreme simplicity of the
baseline model and the scarcity of the data, this exercise should only be interpreted
as a simple illustration of inﬂation zone targeting. Nonetheless, since a number of
authors in the inﬂation targeting literature have advocated the adoption of an inﬂation
targeting framework for the U.S. and the Euro area, it would seem useful provide this
simple illustration based on our analysis.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Figure 9. The three panels on the left-
hand side show the dynamically optimal policy based on U.S. parameters while the
right-hand side panels provide the same information based on Euro area parameters.
The top panel on each side reports the familiar relationship between the observed
inﬂation gap and the intended output gap in the next period. The middle and lower
panels report the implied optimal response of the real interest rate to the inﬂation gap
given a zero current output gap (middle panel), and the response to the output gap
given a zero inﬂation gap (lower panel). Thus, the middle and lower panel illustrate
the response coecients of the optimal policy rule.
In each panel the solid line corresponds to the optimal policy for the L-Q frame-
work, while the dotted curve represents the dynamically optimal policy when the
policymaker has zone-quadratic preferences and the economy is characterized by a
zone-linear short-run inﬂation-output tradeo. Comparing the top left panel for the
U.S. to the bottom panel in gure 10, it becomes apparent that combining the zone-
quadratic preferences and the zone-linear Phillips curve increases the width of the
region of \zone-like" behavior.
As expected, the interest rate response to the inﬂation gap depicted in the middle
panel is a mirror image of the response of the intended output gap. The size of the
necessary response, of course, depends on the estimated interest elasticity of aggregate
demand, which is rather small in the case of the U.S. estimates. Not surprisingly,
given our assumptions, the interest rate response to the current output gap is always
linear and coincides with the optimal policy response in the L-Q framework. As shown
31in section 3 it is simply determined by the ratio of the coecients in the output gap
equation.27
As far as the Euro area parameters are concerned, we also nd that the optimal
policy response to inﬂation exhibits a \zone-like" region. The width of this zone is
somewhat smaller than in the U.S. case, primarily because the estimated zone in the
Phillips curve is only about 2% compared to about 3% in the case of the U.S. data.
The optimal policy does not exhibit as much smoothness as in the case of the U.S.,
and the \inaction" zone is a bit more pronounced. The reason simply is that the
chosen value for the standard error of demand shocks is only half of the U.S. value.
Finally, the optimal interest rate responses are somewhat smaller in the case of the
Euro area, primarily because the estimated interest rate elasticity of demand is twice
as large.
Structural Uncertainty
As a last step, we consider the implications of uncertainty regarding the structure
of the economy for optimal policy. Specically, building on the inﬂation zone tar-
geting example for the U.S. and the Euro area that we just discussed, we ask how a
policymaker should behave if he is uncertain as to whether the relationship between
inﬂation and output in the economy is best described by the linear or zone-linear
Phillips curves under consideration. To capture this uncertainty, we simply posit
that when the policymaker decides what policy to adopt in period t he holds the
view that the output-inﬂation relationship relevant for period t+1 is the zone-linear
one with probability p and the linear one with probability 1 − p. For simplicity,
we maintain that the probability p remains xed over time and abstract from the
policymaker's possible eorts to reduce this uncertainty through learning.28
Figure 10 presents the resulting optimal policies for alternative values of the proba-
bility p. From top to bottom, the three rows correspond to the values, 0.75, 0.5 and
0.25. As in Figure 9, the panels on the left are based on parameters for the U.S. while
the ones on the right are based on parameters for the Euro area. Thus, the top row in
Figure 9 which is based on the assumption that the Phillips curve is zone-linear with
27However, to apply this response appropriately, it is also necessary to take into account the fact
that in real-time the output gap is measured with substantial error. See e.g. Orphanides (1998) and
Smets (1998).
28This approach closely parallels the modeling of multiplicative uncertainty in Brainard (1967) (see
Estrella and Mishkin, 1999, for a recent exposition) but diers from the robust control approach in
Sargent (1999) and Onatski and Stock (1999). Wieland (1998) illustrates the dierences in optimal
policy that arise with active learning.
32certainty, is directly comparable to the policies shown in Figure 10 and corresponds to
the limiting case with p = 1. As can be seen from Figure 10, even if the policymaker
is not certain that he faces a zone-linear Phillips curve, if the presumption of linearity
is under signicant doubt, policy will exhibit \zone-like" characteristics. Of course,
this behavior becomes increasingly muted if greater condence is placed on the linear
specication, that is, for lower values of p.
8 Conclusion
The success of monetary policy in restoring near price stability over the past decade
in many industrialized nations has brought the question of the relevant forces for the
design of monetary policy in a low inﬂation environment to the forefront. When inﬂa-
tion is much higher than the desirable long-run target, there is not much controversy
that policy ought to aim for reducing inﬂation. Once low inﬂation is achieved, how-
ever, ner details need to be worked out. How forcefully should policy lean against
shocks that might induce minor deviations of inﬂation from its desirable long-run
target? When is it sensible to employ the blunt force of the monetary instrument to
eect changes in aggregate demand with that aim? What is the appropriate level of
tolerance for the resulting ﬂuctuations in output and employment?
Conventional analysis of optimal monetary policy has typically rested on the paradigm
of quadratic preferences and a linear economy to provide answers to such questions.
However, this choice primarily reﬂects the mathematical convenience embedded in
these assumptions and is far from innocuous. Monetary policy practice in several
countries which have pursued an explicit inﬂation-targeting strategy and achieved a
low-inﬂation environment, suggests that the linear-quadratic framework fails to cap-
ture some of the practical considerations that inﬂuence policy decisions, in particular
the use of target ranges instead of point targets.
In this paper we have investigated two alternative deviations from the linear-quadratic
paradigm, namely zone-quadratic preferences and a zone-linear Phillips curve. Our
analysis suggests that when inﬂation is near the policymaker's bliss level, a policy-
maker may want to avoid deliberate attempts at changing aggregate demand that
would be necessary for further improvements in inﬂation performance. As a result
policy is characterized by a zone of inaction for small deviations of inﬂation from
target. Alternatively, this policy can be characterized as inﬂation targeting with a
33\thick" inﬂation target.
We have also explored the implications of uncertainty due to unforeseen demand and
price shocks for inﬂation zone targeting. First, in the case of zone-linear preferences
the zone of inaction is replaced by zone-like behavior, that is, a moderate policy
response to inﬂation inside the zone and a more activist response outside of the zone.
Although a policymaker with zone-quadratic preferences faced with a small inﬂation
gap may not yet perceive a signicant welfare loss, it is optimal to respond to this
inﬂation gap because of the increased likelihood of inﬂation falling outside this zone in
the future due to unexpected price or demand shocks. Second, in the case of a zone-
linear Phillips curve the zone of inaction increases with the variance of price shocks,
because the steep cost of small improvements in inﬂation creates an option value to
wait, while demand shocks again induce zone-like behavior with a moderated policy
response inside the zone. Finally, we also considered the eect of model uncertainty.
Clearly, the available evidence does not allow a clear-cut distinction between the linear
and the zone-linear Phillips curve specications on empirical grounds. We show that
if the policymaker assigns some probability to each of the two cases, the optimal
policy involves a moderated response to inﬂation deviations within the zone. In sum,
these results indicate that uncertainty provides a possible rationale for central banks
that have adopted zone rather than point targets, to respond at least moderately to
small inﬂation deviations within the zone.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw eh a v el e f tm a n yi m p o r t a n te l e m e n t so fm o n e t a r yp o l -
icy in a low inﬂation environment out of the analysis by concentrating on a simple
stylized model. For example, our model does not capture the appearance of inter-
est rate smoothing and inertia that monetary policy exhibits in many countries (e.g.
Sack, 1998, Sack and Wieland, 1999, and Woodford, 1999), and although it takes into
account some nonlinearities in the structure of the economy it does not consider the
practical concerns that arise from the presence of the zero bound on nominal interest
rates in a low inﬂation environment (e.g. Fuhrer and Madigan, 1997, Orphanides
and Wieland, 1998, and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1998). Furthermore, we have
maintained the simplifying assumption of adaptive expectations and have abstracted
from the possible gains from commitment to maintaining inﬂation stability that be-
come evident in more forward looking models (e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999;
Lengwiler and Orphanides, 1998; Levin, Wieland and Williams 1999; and Woodford,
1999). Introducing rational expectations would bring additional interesting elements
34into the analysis and is a useful extension for future research. For instance, recog-
nition of the increased policy responsiveness outside the inﬂation zone would have a
stabilizing eect on inﬂation within the zone similar to the type of honeymoon eects
discussed in the exchange rate target zone literature.
Our analysis has been normative in nature, simply providing possible rationales as
to why it may be sensible for central banks to pursue policies with inﬂation zone
targeting characteristics. Of course, the two rationales studied may not necessar-
ily provide the best motivation for the actual practice of inﬂation zone targeting as
currently implemented. A number of alternative and possibly complementary moti-
vations have been advanced. One argument we discussed earlier is that target zones
provide a simple way for communicating unconditional condence intervals for inﬂa-
tion to the public. Another is that if targets are announced at infrequent intervals
and target changes involve some cost, a zone target allows partial adjustment to new
information arising in the interim period. Further, an inﬂation target zone may be
used to accommodate transient inﬂation shocks, as a partial substitute for target-
ing core inﬂation. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to provide formal
microeconomic foundations for these and other potential rationales for the practice
of inﬂation zone targeting. Finally, as data from the practical experience in various
countries accumulate, it would be very interesting to test empirically whether interest
rate setting by central banks that have announced zone targets is consistent with the
nonlinear decision rules implied by the theory.
35Appendix: The Numerical Dynamic Programming Algorithm
The algorithm for computing the value function and optimal policy relies on successive
application of the functional operator T, which is based on the Bellman equation (8)








l(; ^ y;e;u)+W(0(pi; ^ y;e;u))f(e)f(u)dedu (A.1)
Here W(:) denotes a continuous bounded function of the state variable and represents
an approximation of the value function V in equation (8). l denes the one-period
loss function, while  and 0 represent this period's and next period's values of the
inﬂation rate{the state variable of this DP problem. ^ y is the intended output gap,
which is eectively the control variable. Next period's value of the inﬂation rate, 0,
is a function of the intended output gap ^ y, the current inﬂation rate  and of the
shocks to the inﬂation and output equation, e and u. f(e)a n df(u) stand for the
normal density functions of these zero-mean, normally distributed shocks.
Successive application of the operator T will generate a sequence of functions Wn
that will converge to the value function V ,i fT is a contraction mapping. Note that
the space of continuous bounded functions is a complete and separable metric space




jWn() − Wn+1()j (A.2)
Standard arguments can be used to show that Blackwell's suciency conditions of
monotonicity and discounting are satised and that T is a contraction mapping. The
proof follows Stokey and Lucas (1989), Chapter 9. The contraction mapping implies
that:
d(TWn+1;TW n)  d(Wn+1;W n) (A.3)
Thus, T has a unique xed point, V , which can be computed by value iteration, that
is, by successive application of the operator T. TnW converges to V uniformly as
n !1 . A convenient starting value W0 is the single period loss function l(:).
It is straightforward to construct an upper bound on the approximation error. If
Wn+1 = TWn,t h e nd(Wn+1;W n)  (Wn;W n−1) and after iterating d(Wn+1+i;W n+i) 








This bound only depends on the discount factor  and the distance between the
approximations obtained in the last two iterations. Note also that the time needed for
convergence within a maximal error bound can be reduced signicantly by introducing
policy iterations in between every value iteration.
The numerical algorithm is implemented as follows: rst, compute starting values W0
for a grid of values of the state variable () and save them in a table; second, calculate
W1 by applying the operator T to W0 and update said table. This step involves a
minimization with respect to the control ^ y for each grid point. This minimization in
turn requires repeated evaluation of the two integrals in (A:1). The one-period loss
function l(:) and the transition equation 0(:) are known functions and the density
functions for u and e are normal. Thus the integrals can be calculated using repeated
Gaussian quadrature and values of W0 from the table, where W(:) is evaluated in
between grid points by bilinear interpolation.
Given an approximation of this integral the minimization problem can be solved by
standard numerical optimization procedures. However the search for the minimum
requires special care because there may exist multiple local minima. As a consequence
there may be kinks in the value function and discontinuities in the optimal policy.
In particular, this is the case for the zone-linear specication of the Phillips curve.
Therefore we need to use a slow but secure optimization procedure such as golden
section search supplemented by a rough initial grid search. For each value of ,t h e
minimum in ^ y constitutes the value of W1 at  that is used to update the table. The
maximum of jW1() − W0()j is used to calculate the upper bound of the approxi-
mation error. Finally, this procedure is repeated to obtain W2 a n ds oo nu n t i lt h e
dierence between two successive approximations is suciently small (< 0:5%).
The algorithm is programmed in Matlab and the computations were performed on
Pentium PC's as well as SUN Unix workstations. For a more detailed discussion of nu-
merical dynamic programming, quadrature, interpolation and optimization methods
used in implementing this algorithm see Judd (1998).
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yt = constant + yt−1 − rt−1 + ut
Euro Area United States
(OECD) (OECD) (CBO) (CBO)
1976-1998 1976-1998 1976-1998 1960-1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 1:07 1:03 0:54 0:64
(0:34) (0:16) (0:56) (0:43)
 0:77 0:47 0:64 0:63
(0:11) (0:16) (0:16) (0:12)
 0:40 0:32 0:23 0:23
(0:10) (0:13) (0:14) (0:13)
u 0:84 1:51 1:62 1:80
Notes: Estimated with annual data with least squares over the periods shown. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. The constant term provides an estimate for r .A l l
data are in percent. OECD and CBO refer to source of series used for the output
gap, y. The real interest rate, r, is constructed as the average rate during a year




Linear: t = t−1 + yt + et
ZoneLinear: t = t−1 + Z(yt;)+et
Euro Area United States
(OECD) (OECD) (CBO) (CBO)
1976-1998 1976-1998 1976-1998 1960-1998
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear
 0:34 0:39 0:31 0:31
(0:13) (0:09) (0:08) (0:07)
e 0:96 0:85 0:89 1:06
ZoneLinear
 2:01 :93 :12 :9
 0:81 0:59 0:53 0:60
(0:28) (0:13) (0:12) (0:11)
e 0:94 0:85 0:86 0:99
Notes: Estimated with annual data with least squares over the periods shown. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. All data are in percent. OECD and CBO refer to
source of series used for the output gap, y. Inﬂation,  is measured as the annual
percentage change in the output deﬂator (Q4/Q4 basis.) For the ZoneLinear case, we
estimated regressions with alternative zone widths, starting with  = 0 and raising
it in 0.1 increments. The estimates shown reﬂect the choice of  that resulted in the
smallest sum of squared errors.
44Figure 1
Quadratic and ZoneQuadratic Loss Functions











Notes: The solid line plots the quadratic inﬂation loss, ( − )2. The dotted line
plots the zone-quadratic inﬂation loss Z( − ;)2 w i t haz o n ew i d t h ,,o ft w o
percent.
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omega = 1 , beta = 0.9
Notes: In each panel the horizontal axis is the state variable, t, and the vertical
axis the intended output gap, ^ yt+1. The thin solid line shows the optimal policy for
the L-Q model. The dotted line shows the corresponding optimal policy in the L-ZQ
model. The top row shows the solution to the static problems ( = 0) whereas the
bottom row shows the solution to the dynamic problem (>0).
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Notes: The dotted line plots the linear Phillips curve t+1 = t + 1 yt+1. The solid
line plots the zone-linear Phillips curve t+1 = t + 2 Z(yt+1;) with a zone width,
, of two percent and a slope 2 > 1:
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omega = 1 , beta = 0.9
Notes: In each panel the horizontal axis is the state variable, t, and the vertical
axis the intended output gap, ^ yt+1. The thin solid line shows the optimal policy for
the L-Q model. The dotted line shows the corresponding optimal policy in the ZL-Q
model. The top row shows the solution to the static problems ( = 0) whereas the
bottom row shows the solution to the dynamic problem (>0).
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Optimal Policy in the Linear{ZoneQuadratic Model
With Uncertainty





























































price and demand shocks
Notes: The upper panel incorporates the uncertainty in the inﬂation equation only.
The lower panel reﬂects both inﬂation and output equation uncertainty. The thin
solid line shows the optimal policy for the L-Q model. The dashed line shows the
optimal policy in the L-ZQ model without uncertainty and the dotted line shows the
corresponding optimal policy with uncertainty.
51Figure 8
Optimal Policy in the ZoneLinear{Quadratic Model
With Uncertainty





























































price and demand shocks
Notes: The upper panel incorporates the uncertainty in the inﬂation equation only.
The lower panel reﬂects both inﬂation and output equation uncertainty. The thin
solid line shows the optimal policy for the L-Q model. The dashed line shows the
optimal policy in the ZL-Q model without uncertainty and the dotted line shows the
corresponding optimal policy with uncertainty.
52Figure 9
Optimal Policy in the ZoneLinear{ZoneQuadratic Model






















































































































































Euro: interest rate response to output
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Euro: probability = 0.25
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